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Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and 
Justice in the Global South 
Christopher E. Stone 
 
 
With funding from the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development, (DFID), the Program in Criminal 
Justice Policy and Management (PCJ) at the Harvard Kennedy 
School has been supporting state officials and civil society 
organizations in Jamaica, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria to 
develop and use their own indicators to spark, reinforce, and 
communicate progress toward strategic goals in justice and 
safety. In 2010, PCJ began collaborating with officials in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), extending existing efforts in the 
law and justice sector funded by the Australian Government 
Aid Program (AusAID).  
The aim of the project is to equip government and civil 
society organizations with the skills and experience to design 
their own indicators, routinely assess those indicators, and 
use them to drive meaningful reform in the justice sector. 
Building this capacity is a long-term undertaking, for the 
desire for indicators and the skill in their construction must 
permeate the organizational culture in governmental and 
non‐governmental bodies.  It is also a fluid process: 
indicators serve ambitions, policies, governments, and staffs 
that inevitably change over time. 
The prototype indicators developed in this project are 
different from the indicators in international systems created 
in the Global North for use in the Global South. They start by 
finding successes, however modest, and strengthen norms 
and standards that emerge in the course of reviewing local 
practices. They also perform different kinds of development 
work: They support domestic ambitions for justice and 
safety, reinforce management operations in government, and 
align the work of individual agencies with sector-wide goals. 
At the same time, these and other examples of country-led 
indicator development complement the growing number of 
globally conceived indicator projects by grounding the 
measurement culture of international development in local 
customs, and by articulating domestic sources of legitimacy 
for the standards implicit in the norms in global indicator 
projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. 
In matters of government, indicators are instruments 
of power.  They are not merely this, for indicators can 
also be sources of insight and pride, promoting good 
governance through inspiration rather than coercion. 
Still, the reason for the present interest in 
governance indicators is their utility for those who 
would exercise power in the work of government. 
In other walks of life, indicators play a more 
straightforward role. Oral temperature and blood 
pressure are relatively benign indicators of personal 
health, just as barometric pressure is an 
uncomplicated indicator of weather; but the ranking 
of cities by their homicide rates, the discussion of low 
rates of criminal convictions, or the publication of 
surveys reporting rising fear of crime are not mere 
diagnostic exercises; they are efforts to shape in 
particular ways the priorities of police, prosecutors, 
judges, and the ministers. They are efforts to turn the 
legal and penal apparatus of the state to particular 
purposes.  
Indicators, as I use the term here, are measures of 
the performance of a system, and governance 
indicators in particular are measures of the 
performance of government systems: educational, 
health, environmental, transportation, economic.   
Student test results are used as indicators of the 
quality of a state’s educational system, just as 
maternal mortality rates are used as indicators of the 
quality of the public health system. The consumer-
price index in a country and its labor force 
participation rate are indicators of how well a 
government is managing the economy.  I focus here 
on a particular subset of governance indicators: 
measures of safety and justice.  
As instruments of power, indicators are available to 
many different actors with various relationships to 
formal authority.  Elected officials can employ Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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indicators to manage operations that they directly 
oversee—a straightforward use of indicators as a 
management tool to exercise legitimate authority.   
But where multiple officials at different hierarchical 
levels and in different departments are vying for 
control over some government policy, and where 
NGOs, foreign governments, and international 
bodies are also eager to influence this policy, 
advancing a particular set of indicators can be a 
subtle yet effective way of gaining some control of 
government policy and priorities, particularly when 
the more blatant exercise of power might appear to 
be illegitimate.  What makes indicators so attractive 
in these circumstances is that they carry their own 
technical claims to legitimacy. 
The use of indicators as instruments of power is 
particularly striking in developing countries where 
international donors and institutions of global 
governance exert considerable influence.  A national 
police service may find its performance measured by 
dozens of competing indicators specified by its 
commander, by the country’s prime minister, by the 
finance ministry, by multiple bilateral donors, and by 
various agencies in the UN family.  In many 
instances, none of the indicators are used effectively 
nor the data collected accurately.  The problem may 
appear to be a lack of skills, inadequate equipment, 
or nearly constant requests for new indicators. No 
sooner is a data system purchased to calculate one 
set of indicators than the clerks are directed to find 
the data needed for a different set.  The result, as one 
aid official put it to me recently, is that many 
developing countries are littered with the carcasses 
of failed indicator projects—the consultants paid and 
gone, and those charged with administering justice 
increasingly cynical about time wasted on 
measurement when there is real work to be done. 
In these settings, however, a field of failed indicator 
projects may be a sign, not of skill deficiencies, but of 
resistance in a particular agency to the exercise of 
power from some other government department or 
from outside of government itself.  The challenge for 
those ambitious to advance the use of indicators 
across government or internationally—whether in a 
prime minister’s office of an international 
development agency—is to align indicators with the 
ambitions of those in positions of immediate and 
legitimate authority. 
It will help here to consider indicators deployed at 
three distinct levels of governance: within an 
individual ministry or government department, 
across government as a whole, and at the level of 
global governance.  The same indicator might be 
used at all three levels, but the indicator exerts power 
on behalf of different people and different purposes 
at each level.  For example, a police chief might use 
changes survey results measuring the public fear of 
crime in various neighborhoods to reward or demote 
commanders of the corresponding divisions, while a 
governor or treasury official might use the same 
measure of public fear on a government-wide basis to 
spur better coordination among police and 
prosecutors.  At the level of global governance, the 
UN, the World Bank, or a bilateral aid agency might 
use the same indicator of fear to compare the 
effectiveness of national governance across several 
countries or to measure the relative success of their 
own projects in a region. 
Rarely, however, are the same indicators used at all 
three levels.  More commonly, a police chief will rely 
on one set of indicators, including the numbers of 
arrests, the amount of contraband seized, and the 
level of public support for the police revealed in 
occasional surveys. The governor may focus on the 
numbers of reported homicides and robberies, the 
level of fear among the public, and the cost of police 
services. At the same time, various international 
bodies may be rating the same jurisdiction on its 
prosecution of human trafficking cases, the 
perception of corruption in the police, and the speed 
with which it completes trials in criminal cases.  The 
resulting cacophony of indicators is not simply the 
result of the complexity of efforts to deliver both 
safety and justice, but a result, too, of competing 
priorities and competing strategies at different levels 
of authority over the issues of crime and the 
administration of justice. 
The indicators at these three levels interact.  At each 
level, it is tempting for those exercising power to 
imagine that they can design and deploy indicators 
unilaterally: as if other indicators and their sponsors 
were not simultaneously seeking to shape the 
performance of the same government system.  But 
for those on the receiving ends of these indicators—
such as the police, prosecutors, magistrates, 
corrections officers, clerks, and others engaged in 
making the rule of law real—the competition among 
indicators is unavoidable.  The conflicting incentives, 
partial understandings, and ideological assumptions 
in the various sets of indicators compete not only 
with one another, but also with the values and 
ambitions of those doing the work. 
This paper explores the possibility that governance 
indicators can be harmonized across these three Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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levels, and that doing so will produce effective 
governance.  Specifically, I argue that those 
operating on the global level—particularly in the 
domain of safety, justice, and the rule of law—might 
design their indicators from the bottom up, 
supporting local ambitions and building on the 
legitimate sources of authority close to the 
operations they seek to influence, rather than 
starting with ambitions and power at a global level.  
The paper draws on work my colleagues and I are 
conducting with government officials and civil 
society leaders in Jamaica, Nigeria, Papua New 
Guinea, and Sierra Leone, sponsored by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID).  I draw as well as on a 
separate effort led by the Altus Global Alliance and 
supported by DFID that has been taking a similar 
approach with indicators of police reform in many 
countries across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
Starting with local ambitions and local, legitimate 
authority may help repair a persistent problem in the 
construction of indicators for global governance, 
namely the weak sources of legitimacy for the 
standards implicit in indicators at the global level.  If 
by starting at a local level, our partnerships can 
produce global indicators grounded in local 
standards and ambitions, we might forge a stronger 
global solidarity in the effort to improve the quality 
of justice and strengthen the rule of law. 
I argue here that such a bottom-up approach is not 
only possible and practical, but has the potential to 
engage citizens and domestic leaders enthusiastically 
in a creative and democratic construction of justice. 
In the next section, I describe what such indicators 
look like when designed collaboratively with 
domestic government officials responsible for some 
part of the administration of justice, and I introduce 
the term “active indicators” to distinguish these from 
indicators designed without the participation of 
local, operational authorities.  In the third section, I 
describe how active indicators can also be created for 
use by citizens in civil society operating with a less 
formal, but nonetheless legitimate, authority.  Here I 
also begin to sketch how locally owned indicators can 
be aggregated up to a global level.  In the fourth 
section, I return to the questions of how active 
indicators built at the domestic level might be spread 
from country to country, eventually creating a 
coherent, global set of common indicators. 
ii. 
On a hot day in February 2010, the Commissioner of 
the Jamaican Constabulary Force walked into a 
meeting of his command staff, already in progress.  
He stood in the back of the darkened room, catching 
a few minutes of a presentation to his staff on 
“change management.”  Before the discussion period 
even began, he turned and left, but not before telling 
the meeting organizer from the Ministry of National 
Security that he would be rearranging his schedule to 
get back at the end of the day—long after the 
meetings had ended—to talk more about the 
presentation.  He had seen something he could use. 
Relatively new in the top job of his long-troubled 
national police service and not yet the master of his 
schedule, the Commissioner returned even later than 
he had planned.  He took a chair in the now nearly 
empty conference room and explained what had 
lured him back. He wanted to see again a scatter-plot 
that my colleagues had constructed with his staff and 
with a researcher in the Ministry of National 
Security, showing the number of raids, vehicle 
searches, and pedestrian stops that each of his 19 
police districts had conducted in 2009, along with 
the number of “hits” each had recorded during the 
year: offenders arrested and guns and vehicles 
seized.  The scatter-plot revealed that for most of the 
divisions, there was a straightforward relationship: 
the more raids and searches, the more hits.  But a 
handful of divisions were worryingly apart from the 
others on the chart, having conducted many more 
raids and searches but achieving no more hits than 
divisions that had conducted a tenth as many.  More 
encouragingly, there were one or two divisions that 
had recorded high numbers of hits while apparently 
conducting relatively few searches and raids. 
The Commissioner had seen all that in an instant 
during the morning presentation and had returned 
because he wanted to use the chart to better 
understand the apparently good work of the highest 
achieving division.  If the results were real, he 
wanted the commander of that division to explain to 
his counterparts at an upcoming command meeting 
what he was doing to get those good results while 
intruding relatively infrequently on the lives and 
liberties of local residents. Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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Each point represents one of the 19 police divisions.  The line illustrates where districts would be expected to fall as they raise or 
lower the number of searches in response to local crime problems.  Districts 15, 17, and 19 appear to be conducting high numbers 
of searches without many seizures.  District 1, in contrast, seems to be seizing  many guns, vehicles, and offenders while 
conducting modest numbers of raids and other searches. 
The Commissioner’s interest spurred his staff and 
the team that had created the scatter-plot to dig 
down into these data: attempting to chart the trends 
month-by-month and testing which reports were 
reliable and which spurious.  The team had to 
harmonize inconsistent definitions of searches and 
seizures, and facilitate agreement on how to count 
searches and hits. In May 2010, the meeting that the 
Commissioner had envisioned took place, with all of 
the divisional commanders discussing a scatter-plot 
that showed how each division had moved both on 
“searches” and “hits” from January through March 
2010.  Then, in July and August, the team trained the 
station officers-in-charge, divisional data clerks, and 
headquarters analysts in the continued production of 
this indicator so the Commissioner and the division 
commanders can use monthly scatter-plots on a 
continuing basis to improve the effectiveness of the 
raids and searches they conduct. 
The relationship of hits to searches, illustrated on the 
Jamaican scatter-plot, is an example of an active 
indicator.  It is designed specifically for use by an 
official with formal authority over the people 
expected to produce the outcome being measured.   
In concrete terms, active indicators: (i) capture 
performance in tight timeframes: usually days, 
weeks, or months; (ii) present data at the level of 
operational responsibility; (iii) ground discussion at 
management meetings where officials are 
accountable for results; and (iv) describe outcomes 
in common language, often in graphic form, 
understandable by people both inside and outside 
the institution. 
A few weeks later on the other side of the globe, some 
colleagues and I sat with a wise but dispirited 
assistant commissioner of the Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary.  Taped to the wall of the 
c o n f e r e n c e  r o o m  i n  p o l i c e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  i n  P o r t  
Moresby was a page from a flip-chart titled “Strategic 
Planning,” apparently from a meeting some days 
earlier.  A single person’s handwriting filled the large 
page with a couple of dozen generic categories used Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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by consultants everywhere, from “vision and 
mission” at the top to “monitoring and evaluation” at 
the very bottom, almost falling off the page. 
The assistant commissioner explained that he is in 
charge of corporate services and administration 
including all of the Constabulary’s monitoring and 
evaluation, but his department has been starved of 
resources and kept apart from the operational core of 
the organization.  As a result, he has little up-to-date 
performance data.  Observing an operations 
management meeting for the National Capital 
District a few days later confirmed the assistant 
commissioner’s description.  Vehicle thefts are on the 
rise, said one participant; but this was a data-free 
meeting, with no evidence of trends farther back 
than the latest anecdote. 
Until recently, demand for quantitative indicators of 
police performance in Papua New Guinea emanated 
from outside the RPNGC.  In the Law and Justice 
Sector Secretariat, the “monitoring and evaluation 
unit” is responsible for reporting on 64 indicators 
annually, and does so typically about six months 
after the close of each year.  The report for 2009—the 
sixth Annual Report—includes relatively little data 
collected from the Constabulary, but instead relies 
heavily on a Community Crime Survey that shows 
“many people…reporting poorer perceptions of 
police” and higher levels of crime victimization. 
The indicators in the Annual Report are not 
referenced in the operational meetings of the 
Constabulary and the reason for the distance 
between them is readily apparent.  The Annual 
Report is the product of the Law and Justice Sector 
Secretariat, which—according to the opening pages 
of the report itself—was established to support the 
Law and Justice Sector Working Group, which was 
established to support the National Coordinating 
Mechanism, which is overseen by the Ministerial 
Committee on Justice, Law and Order.  This nested 
set of coordinating bodies is charged with 
implementing the “three pillars” of the National Law 
and Justice Policy and Plan of Action, and has 
advanced that project by developing a Sector 
Strategic Framework with five goals.  This, in turn, 
has given rise to a Performance Monitoring 
Framework with 18 indicators and 64 “sub-
indicators” to track progress toward the five goals.   
The Jamaicans have their equivalent of the 64 
indicators in Papua New Guinea, as does just about 
every nation, province, and municipality at every 
income level.  They can be useful, but they are not 
active indicators: they are not suited for active 
management but—at best—for more general 
diagnosis.  Their architects hope that they can align 
the long term goals of separate government 
departments with each other and, equally important 
in developing countries, with the goals of 
international donors. Such indicators may provoke 
conversation and they may inspire reports in the 
press, but on their own they rarely spur action in 
operational agencies.   They represent a tentative 
consensus about a collection of more or less 
compatible ambitions, but they do not have the force 
of fully determined authority. 
The Commissioner of the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary is a member of the National 
Coordinating Mechanism, and so has a stake in the 
64 indicators. He is reportedly pleased when they 
imply that the police are doing something right, but 
these are not the indicators he needs to actively drive 
change in the police.  When the assistant 
commissioner for RPNGC’s corporate services saw 
the scatter-plot designed for the Jamaican 
Commissioner, he recognized the difference 
immediately and began to think about how he could 
create indicators for his Commissioner that would be 
similarly useful for month-on-month management of 
the police. 
In addition to serving the needs of a single 
departmental leader, active indicators can be built to 
support management across separate government 
institutions. Consider, for example, the issue of 
pretrial detention in Lagos, Nigeria.  In any country, 
pretrial detention can easily escape management 
attention because the problems of prolonged 
detention and overcrowded conditions are felt in 
remand prisons, yet prison superintendents have no 
authority to solve the problems.  They cannot shorten 
the stay of detainees or prevent new ones from 
arriving.  Those who possess that authority—
prosecutors and judges—do not see or experience the 
problem of overcrowding on a day to day basis, 
allowing them easily to overlook it.  In Lagos, that 
universal problem is compounded by Nigeria’s 
federal structure.  Prisons are operated by the federal 
government and the police who prosecute minor 
cases are federal employees, yet prosecutors in 
serious cases and the criminal courts themselves are 
under the control of each state.  When the Attorney 
General of Lagos State became concerned about the 
problem of pretrial detention, he understood the 
jurisdictional complexity and so joined forces with 
the prison administration to create an active 
indicator that would allow him and prison officials to Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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begin to manage the problem in meetings with 
prosecutors and the judges. 
Why did the Attorney General need to create a new 
indicator?  A simple search on the internet would 
have told him that 65 percent of the prisoners in 
Nigeria were being held pretrial.  Indeed, this 
indicator is available for almost every country in the 
world.  Why did the Attorney General need anything 
else? 
The percentage of prisoners in pretrial detention is 
not an active indicator. No one is accountable for 
raising or lowering it, nor would a reduction in the 
number necessarily mean that the number of people 
in detention was being reduced or that overcrowding 
was being eased.  If, for example, prison sentences 
were substantially lengthened, the percentage of 
people in pretrial detention would fall, without 
reducing their numbers. Indeed, overcrowding would 
become worse.  
Nor could the Attorney General simply use as his 
indicator the number of people in pretrial detention. 
This indicator would have two faults. First, the raw 
number in detention is the product of so many 
actions by people in so many different institutions—
police, prosecutors, judges, and legislators—that no 
one feels responsibility for it.  Second, pretrial 
detention itself is not unjust.  It only creates injustice 
when (a) it lasts excessively long, (b) it is imposed on 
people accused of trivial crimes, (c) it is imposed on 
people without even minimal evidence of their guilt, 
or (d) it entails inhumane conditions of detention. 
An active indicator of pretrial detention must focus 
the attention of officials on one or more of these four 
specific problems in their direct control.  Because so 
many of the horror stories of pretrial detention in 
Nigeria concerned people detained for years without 
trial, the Attorney General decided to focus on 
problem (a): the length of pretrial detention.  Now he 
needed an active indicator.  
One only knows the full length of a suspect’s pretrial 
detention when it ends.  So to build an indicator of 
the length of detention, the Attorney General’s staff, 
with the assistance of the Lagos-based CLEEN 
Foundation and some of my colleagues and students, 
assembled a sample of exit data from early 2010 
already collected manually by the prisons in Lagos 
State and available in giant ledgers. The data turned 
out to include not only how long each person had 
been detained, but also the court in which the case 
was heard, and how each person’s pretrial detention 
ended: with conviction and sentence, dismissal of the 
case, payment of bail, or some other event.  
The first thing the exit data taught everyone involved 
was how many suspects were already staying a very 
short period of time in detention.  So much attention 
had been focused on the long-term detainees, that 
the hundreds of prisoners cycling in and out of 
detention were almost invisible from a prison 
management perspective.  Both prison staff and 
prosecutors were therefore surprised when the data 
revealed that the median length of stay for all 
detainees in the 2010 sample was 14 days.  Looked at 
in more detail, the data on length-of-stay in 
detention revealed that the officials in Ikoyi Prison 
were facing the same double challenge the 
superintendents of most remand prisons face around 
the world: most of their detainees remained a very 
short time in detention, but the relatively few 
detainees who remain a long time use up the lion’s 
share of the prison resources.  Specifically, the 2010 
sample from Ikoyi Prison showed that the suspects 
remaining in detention a month or less accounted for 
almost two-thirds of all detainees (64 percent), but 
accounted for only about eight percent of the prison 
space occupied over time.  In contrast, only about 
four percent of suspects remained in detention for a 
year or more, but accounted for almost half (47.5 
percent) of the prison space occupied over time. 
Working from the existing data, it is possible to 
construct an active indicator that might allow the 
Attorney General and the prison officials in Lagos to 
manage the size of their remand prison population.  
Reducing each stay by one week would reduce the 
prison population by 8 percent, a worthwhile 
strategy since the target seems achievable and most 
of the suspects are staying short time in any case.  At 
the same time, completing all of the long term cases 
(those that have already kept a suspect in detention 
for a year) before the end of another six months in 
detention would reduce the remand population by a 
further 17 percent, for a total reduction of 25 percent.  
The first strategy would have to be applied to all 
cases, while the second could be concentrated on the 
courts handling the long-term cases, which account 
for only four percent of the detainees. If these 
strategies succeed, the black bars on the chart on the 
following page should begin to even out, while the 
grey bars should be concentrated even more on the 
shorter stays. Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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Data include all detainees whose pretrial detention at Ikoyi Prison ended in January or March 2010.  The total of 964 detainees in 
the sample used a total of 64,123 prison days during their time in pretrial detention.  The chart can be read in this way: 12% of 
detainees stayed a day or less, using only 0.2% of the total prison days; but while only 4% of detainees stayed a year or more, they 
used 47.5% of the total prison days. 
 
The two indicators from Jamaica and Nigeria are 
“active” not only because they are sensitive to 
interventions, measured in tight time frames, 
expressed in simple language, and designed for 
particular management activities, but also because 
they are linked to particular officials who exercise 
legitimate authority over the subjects being 
measured.  The divisional commanders in the 
Jamaican Constabulary Force are clear about the 
Commissioner’s authority, so the indicator relating 
searches to hits can effectively serve the 
Commissioner’s purpose.  In Nigeria, the Lagos State 
Attorney General has made common cause with the 
superintendent of the prisons in his state, and 
between them they can effectively push the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the courts to help them 
with a problem visible principally in the prisons.  If 
there is a weakness in the pretrial detention 
indicator, it is the weakness of the link to the police 
who, as the prosecutors in minor cases, also 
contribute to delays. 
Ideally, active indicators at a department or sector 
level are aligned with the national, long-term, and 
mid-term plans; but such alignment should not be 
taken for granted.  It is common to hear complaints 
from officials in operational agencies that they are 
measured against too many different sets of 
indicators: their own boss has one, the finance 
ministry has another, the President or Prime 
Minister may have a third, and international donors 
have a handful of their own.  The multiplicity of 
indicators is not, in itself, a problem if they are well 
and clearly aligned, but too often they are developed 
independently of one another, overlapping only by 
coincidence, competing for the attention of front-line 
officials increasingly cynical about measurement. 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to get meaningful 
commitment to an aligned set of indicators by Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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starting at the global level.  The officials and 
consultants developing the indicators at that level 
rarely have the time or opportunity to dig down into 
the operational units of the justice sector and 
understand the priorities driving performance there.  
Relying simply on the formal agreement of domestic 
officials to indicators developed at the global level 
will rarely produce either alignment or commitment. 
Such agreements are politely made and easily 
ignored.  These two examples from Jamaica and 
Nigeria suggest a different course: fashioning 
indicators first to advance the strategic ambitions 
management purposes at the domestic level, and 
building up from there. 
What would such a program look like?  In Papua 
New Guinea, for example, a working group that 
spans several operational departments is building 
active indicators for the coordination of customary 
and magistrates courts and for the management of 
private security services, and the effort is 
coordinated by the Law and Justice Sector 
Secretariat and the Department of National Planning 
to maintain explicit links among the active 
indicators, a new set of mid-term development 
indicators, and the longer standing 64 sector-wide 
development indicators.  These design and alignment 
processes recognize that the authority that these 
indicators most directly convey is the power of those 
leading the operational agencies. 
 
iii. 
Active indicators, by definition, are tightly linked to 
authority, but this need not be the authority of 
government officials.  Active indicators can serve 
citizens and civil society as well as the state, for there 
is legitimate authority in civil society, too. 
Consider the common need to improve the quality of 
operations and service at police stations. This might 
include the good functioning of equipment, the 
knowledge of police officers in each station, and the 
conditions of detention for suspects. It would 
probably also include the transparency and 
accessibility of those stations to the people in the 
districts they serve, specifically the clarity of signage, 
the display of useful public information, the 
provision of waiting rooms, officers who do not 
expect a bribe to accept a report, and the courtesy 
and respect with which those officers meet visitors.  
There is nothing to stop senior police officers from 
creating active indicators to monitor all of these 
aspects of the quality of their police stations, but 
such officials usually put a higher priority on issues 
of enforcement activity and discipline. Citizens 
themselves, in contrast, tend to put a high priority on 
these “customer service” aspects of police station 
management. Taking advantage of this citizen 
interest, an alliance of domestic NGOs in 2006 
organized the first police station visitors week: a 
mobilization of citizens—mostly in developing 
countries—who used a common protocol to visit 
police stations and score their performance on 
precisely these aspects of their operations and service 
to citizens.  The annual event has been repeated 
regularly since then, the most recent at this writing 
taking place in October 2009, when more than 5,000 
individuals visited and rated police stations in 20 
countries.  The event is coordinated by the Altus 
Global Alliance with financial support from the UK 
Department for International Development.1 
The police stations are scored by the visitors, who 
each answer the same 20 questions immediately 
after the visit.  The 20 questions consist of four 
questions in each of five areas of service: (i) 
community orientation, (ii) physical conditions, (iii) 
equal treatment of the public, (iv) transparency and 
accountability, and (v) detention conditions.  Each 
question is answered on a 1-to-5 scale, where 1 is 
totally inadequate and 5 is excellent.  The questions 
on transparency and accountability ask if there is 
information available to the public at the station 
about patterns of crime in the area, about the 
station’s performance in terms of arrests made, 
crimes solved, or public satisfaction, about how to 
make a complaint against the police, and about the 
identities of each police officer or constable.  The 
questions about detention conditions ask if the area 
is safely secured, if individual detainees are identified 
by name or numbers, if there are visiting facilities for 
lawyers, family members, or others, and if the 
conditions are sanitary. 
The ratings are deliberately subjective. The point is 
not to make an objective assessment against some 
purported global norm, but instead to determine how 
well local citizens think that the station performs 
with respect to each issue area.  At the same time, the 
ratings permit comparisons within a country, within 
a region, and globally. 
 
1 In previous years, the Police Station Visitors Week has 
been supported by the Ford Foundation, the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Open Society 
Institute, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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Citizen Assessment of Operations in Police Stations, 2009 
Range and Average Scores in Each Participating Country in Latin America 
 
 Conditions of Detention        Transparency & Accountability 
 
 
Source: Altus Global Alliance, Police Station Visitors Week Global Report, 2009, Tables viii and ix, pages 70-71.  Each 
police station was visited in October 2009 by citizens using a common protocol to score stations on five dimensions, two 
of which appear here.  Numbers of stations visited in each country shown were as follows: Bolivia, 19; Brazil, 235; 
Chile, 53; Colombia, 9; Mexico, 16; Peru, 91.  Participating visitors: 1,748. 
The Police Station Visitors Week ratings are an 
example of participatory indicators where ordinary 
citizens not only join in the process of data collection, 
but control the standards embodied in the indicators.  
In each participating country, NGOs and other 
citizen structures recruited, trained, and deployed 
citizen volunteers.  Each NGO controls the 
recruitment in its area, and the recruitment 
strategies vary widely. 
In Latin America, six countries participated in 2009: 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.   
More than 1,700 citizens visited 423 police stations 
in the region.  The average overall scores were 
highest in Chile and Mexico, and lowest in Bolivia, 
but there was substantial variation from one station 
t o  t h e  n e x t  i n  e a c h  c o u n t r y .   T h i s  v a r i a n c e  d r i v e s  
competition among the stations.  Public reports give 
special recognition to the highest scoring individual 
stations in each country, but police officials are also 
given private reports on the performance of each 
station, allowing national or state officials to 
pinpoint the weak stations depressing the national 
scores. 
The Police Station Visitors Week scores do not make 
a perfect example of active indicators, for the scoring 
is only conducted annually, but in every other 
respect, the scores here meet the definition.  They are 
calculated and presented to officials quickly, and 
they are responsive to changes in performance.  Most 
important, the indicators are tightly linked to Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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legitimate authority over the police officers whose 
work is being measured, but in this case the authority 
lies in the public, not in a senior official. 
If the local NGOs who organize the visits in each city 
and country are successful at persuading the local 
news media to publicize the results or if the NGOs 
otherwise have the attention of police leadership, 
they can drive change through the indicators. The 
report on the 2009 round contains several examples 
of just such reforms produced in earlier years, from 
the establishment of gender desks to the redesign of 
the physical stations themselves.  The Royal 
Malaysian Police have gone so far as to include the 
20 items that comprise the assessment into its own 
monitoring systems and it now invites citizens to 
visit and assess stations throughout the year, not 
only during the global Police Station Visitors Week—
a further reminder that active indicators need to be 
refreshed more often than once a year. 
Like the indicator of searches and hits in Jamaica, 
and the measures of pretrial detention in Lagos, 
Nigeria, the scores from the Police Station Visitors 
Week can usefully be aligned with longer-term, 
national plans and the indicators associated with 
t h o s e .   W h e n  a  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  a g e n c y  o r  a n  
international donor uses this or any other active 
indicator as its indicator of progress, it leverages the 
power and authority of the official using the active 
indicator—or the citizens using it.  In either case, the 
authority of the longer term program is enhanced by 
the incorporation of the active indicator and its 
sponsor’s power.  In contrast, when national plans 
and international donors insist on their own 
indicators of progress without regard to those being 
used by operational departments, they risk a power 
struggle. 
The indicators generated by the Police Station 
Visitors Week are different in this respect from most 
other global indicators, in that they are not 
attempting to bolster the authority of their sponsor 
by reference to some purported international 
standard.  The indicator is organized internationally, 
but the standards are local: how do local citizens 
understand the adequacy of each aspect of service 
being reviewed.   In this way, they harness the 
authority of local citizens rather than national 
standard-setting bodies. 
With that contrast in mind, I turn now to the 
question of how these examples can help us design a 
system or framework of indicators that can be used 
across countries, in very different national contexts. 
iv. 
At a 2009 meeting at the Harvard Kennedy School, 
three officials from Sierra Leone listened as their 
counterparts from Nigeria reported on their efforts 
to develop an active indicator to manage the 
problems of pretrial detention.  The idea of regularly 
collecting data from an exit sample appealed to them, 
and they hoped that they could emulate their West 
African neighbors, creating an indicator with which 
they could monitor the flow and duration of pretrial 
detention. 
Similar opportunities for cross-national inspiration 
abound, for the priorities among leaders of the 
institutions of the justice sector in different countries 
are already surprisingly similar.  The meeting at 
Harvard was simply one attempt to catalyze such 
inspiration, with teams from Jamaica, Nigeria, Papua 
New Guinea, and Sierra Leone each presenting the 
indicators they were designing to advance their own 
ambitions. The Sierra Leone team presented its effort 
to harmonize victimization survey data with 
administrative data on crimes reported to the police 
to create a credible indicator of the level of crime, but 
they left determined to emulate the Nigerian 
indicator of pretrial detention. 
I n  t h e  m o n t h s  f o l l o w i n g  t h a t  m e e t i n g ,  t h e  
construction of a pretrial detention indicator in 
Sierra Leone proved more difficult than the officials 
had expected.  The exit data available in the Lagos 
prisons is not maintained at the remand prison in 
Freetown, so admission data became the only 
measure of flow, depriving the team of any data on 
length-of-stay.  Rather than stop there, however, the 
team constructing the indicator turned to the courts, 
where—at this writing—they have some hope of 
finding a different source of data on the duration of 
detention. 
This suggests an iterative method for the 
construction of global indicators.  Officials and 
technical experts could work together to identify 
local and domestic priorities, building active 
indicators for those with legitimate authority to use 
to drive improvements in performance.   These 
examples could then be shared in any of several 
ways, but the sharing should be country-to-country, 
rather than through intermediaries, encouraging 
emulation.  A further round of indicator development 
would follow in each country, and then another 
opportunity to share the results and find inspiration 
for yet further work. Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South 
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Dialogue is crucial in this iterative process, hence the 
need for direct country-to-country conversation.  The 
dialogue is not merely technical, although it does 
inevitably turn to questions of data quality and 
availability, statistical calculation, and presentation.  
The dialogue is also substantive and normative, with 
participants debating what matters in the 
administration of justice and how chains of causality 
might operate.   Do police reduce crime even when 
they seize a lot of guns or arrest many offenders?     
Which crimes matter most?  How should we conceive 
of the role of private security when we assess the size 
and competence of a nation’s police? 
Yet, for all the uncertainties, the priorities that 
emerge from such dialogue suggest that a coherent 
set of global indicators could emerge relatively 
quickly.  In just two years of such conversations 
among country teams at Harvard, the participants 
are already building consensus around five key 
aspects of their criminal justice systems needing 
indicators: 
1.  Crime and Public Safety, measured 
through a combination of survey data and 
officially recorded crime 
2.  Police Effectiveness, measured in the 
immediate achievements of a variety of 
enforcement actions 
3.  Pretrial Detention, measured by the 
number of long-term detainees whose cases 
are completed without further delay, 
alongside the minimization of detention 
times for minor offenders 
4.  Police-Prosecution Coordination, 
measured by the speed and quality with 
which each responds to the other in the 
preparation of cases for trial 
5.  Coordination of the Formal and 
Customary Justice Systems, measured by 
the frequency of recourse that each system 
has to the other. 
 
This short list is not meant as a complete 
representation of any system, but it does map the 
actual concerns of officials from domestic 
governments and civil society committed to 
improving law enforcement and the administration 
of justice.  More important, it suggests that a system 
of indicators built from the bottom-up would not 
vary dramatically from a system built from the global 
level down.  The difference lies in the opportunities 
for alignment, authorship, and linkage with 
legitimate authority. 
 
Christopher E. Stone is the Daniel and Florence 
Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal 
Justice, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University.  An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the conference on Indicators as a 
Technology of Global Governance, held at NYU Law 
School, September 13-14, 2010. 
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